Opponents of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community often allege that Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud, Mirza Bashir-ud-Deen Mahmood Ahmad (may Allah be pleased with him), the Second Khalifa of the Promised Messiah (peace be upon him), advocated for state coercion to enforce adherence to Islam. Critics typically raise this claim when challenged over the state-sponsored persecution of Ahmadis, using it to pursue three main objectives. First, they attempt to rationalize this persecution by arguing that Ahmadiyya theology itself condones religious compulsion in principle. Second, they stoke fear by alleging that Ahmadis would impose identical repressive measures against their opponents if they ever attained political power. Finally, they seek to discredit the Community by dismissing its public advocacy for religious freedom and the separation of mosque and state as disingenuous posturing.
As historical and theological evidence demonstrates, Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) never advocated for such state coercion. On the contrary, he consistently maintained that worldly authority must never be weaponized to compel spiritual conscience, and that an individual’s personal religious observance lies strictly between them and their Creator.
The Context of the 1936 Address
The origin of this misrepresentation lies in a series of Friday sermons delivered by Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) in 1936, in which he was speaking about a common human problem: why is it relatively easy to accept religious teachings in theory, but so hard to put them into practice?
In his Friday sermon on May 29, 1936, he observed that while the Promised Messiah (peace be upon him) had successfully and rapidly reformed the theological beliefs of his followers, external, practical reform was an ongoing process.
He explained that worldly tyrants can force people to obey overnight because people are terrified of prison or physical punishment. But spiritual reformers do not have police forces or prisons; they must patiently change hearts through goodly exhortation.
To illustrate this disparity between worldly fear and genuine, heart-felt fear of God, he employed a stark hypothetical contrast—a classic oratorical device (farzi misal) common in subcontinental Urdu rhetoric:
“We do not hold political power so that we could reform people through coercion and, like Hitler or Mussolini, banish from the country anyone who does not obey our commands, and inflict exemplary punishment on anyone not ready to listen to us and act upon it. If we had political power, we would accomplish this task within a single day, and we would not let a second day dawn while these flaws still existed within us. If government power were handed to us today and we enforced a decree that anyone who fails to offer prayers in congregation shall be sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, is there anyone who would fail to pray in congregation?
“However, the only consequence we have to offer is saying that Allah the Almighty will be displeased with the person who does not pray in congregation. Yet nowadays, few care about the displeasure of Allah the Almighty. People fear the displeasure of the Englishman, but if it is said that a certain action will incur the displeasure of Allah the Almighty, they do not care about it. If we had state power today and announced that the property of anyone who refuses to give their daughter her rightful inheritance would be confiscated, would there remain a single person in India who would deny daughters their inheritance? Everyone would say, “I have been thinking for a long time about how to give my daughter her inheritance.”
“In short, if we had government power, evening would not fall before all reforms would automatically take place. But the difficulty is that we do not have political power; therefore, we have to resolve this question through some other method. Either we must find some aspect of governance that can be established while remaining under British rule, or we must search for such means that can serve our purpose without the backing of a government.” [Khutbat-e-Mahmud, Vol. 17, p. 337]
In mid-1930s British India—prior to World War II and the full revelation of Axis atrocities—figures like Hitler and Mussolini would be invoked across the Indian political spectrum as universal archetypes of temporal brute force and totalitarian efficiency.
When read fairly, it is obvious he was not laying out a plan to jail people for missing prayers. He was holding up a mirror to human nature. He was lamenting that if the British government or a dictator threatened people with prison, the mosques would be full; but when a spiritual leader warns that God is displeased, people simply shrug it off. It was not a policy proposal, nor a divine mandate to implement physical punishments for missed prayers. As Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) himself immediately noted, the only mechanism available to a spiritual community is moral admonition:
“However, the only consequence we have to offer is saying that Allah the Almighty will be displeased with the person who does not pray in congregation.”
The Meaning of “Governance Without Government”
Critics might point to his concluding remark—that the Community must either establish an “aspect of governance” under British rule or find means “without the backing of a government”—as evidence of an intent to build if not a totalitarian theocratic government, then at least a coercive parallel system.
Historically and practically, this statement referred to the progressive development of the Community’s internal administrative structure (Nizam-e-Jama‘at)—a spiritual and civic organization that has never, from its inception to the present day, possessed or exercised coercive legal power.
Far from an authoritarian apparatus, the Nizam-e-Jama‘at exists exclusively for the spiritual education, moral training, and welfare of those who choose to belong to it. The departmental restructuring of the central executive administration (Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya) was instituted in 1919 and the establishment of the women’s auxiliary organization (Lajna Ima’illah) in 1922. In the years immediately following this sermon, Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) developed two more auxiliary wings—Khuddam-ul-Ahmadiyya for young men in 1938 and Ansarullah for older men in 1940.
Crucially, these bodies possess no police powers, penal jurisdiction, prisons, or corporal sanctions. The Community’s organizational model operates strictly on the Qur’anic principle of moral exhortation (Al-Mau‘izat-ul-Hasanah) and mutual counsel. Membership is entirely dependent on being an Ahmadi Muslim; an individual who decides to sever ties faces no legal, physical, or civil penalty whatsoever.
In cases of persistent, serious moral delinquency or direct defiance of communal values, the maximum sanction available is expulsion from the organizational framework (Ikhraj az Nizam-e-Jama‘at). Membership rights are suspended, they are relieved of organizational duties, and their financial contributions are no longer accepted. This is not state coercion; it is the universal right of any voluntary association to determine the boundaries of its own fellowship.
Moreover, Ikhraj is not an all-encompassing, vindictive “social boycott”. Both Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) and subsequent Khulafa repeatedly clarified that Ikhraj does not permit the severance of blood ties, the neglect of elderly parents, or the abandonment of domestic obligations. Islamic ethics require that basic human courtesy, business dealings, and familial compassion remain intact.
The reduction in social association with such people and other Ahmadis is a natural result of their decision to separate themselves from the close-knit community. Moreover, it functions as a non-violent, collective moral censure—rooted in the Prophetic precedent observed during the Expedition of Tabuk where three companions were shunned due to not participating in the expedition [9:1118]—designed to prompt personal introspection. It is never intended as a permanent condemnation; its sole objective is reconciliation. Over the decades, countless individuals subject to this administrative measure have repented of their past mistakes and been fully restored to active fellowship.
This principle of voluntary association is equally evident in the Community’s internal judicial board (Dar-ul-Qaza), which critics sometimes mischaracterize as an illicit shadow tribunal. Such critics confuse voluntary civic arbitration with the sovereign coercive machinery of the state. Far from operating as a subversive court, Dar-ul-Qaza functions strictly as an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) body, a consensual legal framework recognized and protected by modern legal systems across the democratic world. It possesses zero criminal jurisdiction and cannot issue arrest warrants, subpoena non-consenting parties, levy state fines, or enforce physical penalties. It deals exclusively with civil, domestic, and commercial matters—such as marital mediation, inheritance settlements, and contractual disagreements—and operates entirely upon the mutual, written consent of the disputing parties. Its purpose is purely conciliatory, offering a completely cost-free alternative to protracted and financially ruinous litigation in civil courts by resolving private disputes through speed, equity, and Islamic principles. Far from an arbitrary tribunal, this arbitration system is strictly regulated to safeguard due process, featuring multiple tiers of appellate review to ensure that any party dissatisfied with an initial ruling has a formal avenue to appeal for justice.
The Fundamental Principle: No Force in Faith
A successor to the Promised Messiah (peace be upon him) can never advocate for policies that contravene his teachings. Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (peace be upon him) unambiguously taught that true Islam rejects all forms of physical coercion in matters of personal faith. He stated:
“The Promised Messiah (peace be upon him) has appeared in the world to remove the notion of taking up arms in the name of religion, so that he may demonstrate through arguments and reasoning that Islam is a religion that does not the least bit require the sword to support its propagation. He has come to show that the inherent excellences of the teaching, its verities, insights, arguments, proofs, its living support and signs, and its innate magnetism are the qualities which have always been the cause for its success and propagation. So all those who allege that Islam was spread by dint of the sword should know that they are false in their claim. The effects of Islam do not depend on any coercion for their propagation. If anyone has any doubt in this, they are welcome to stay with me and see that Islam gives proof of its living nature through arguments and signs. Now, God Almighty has willed and intends to cleanse all of the allegations which the impure have levelled against the pure being that is Islam. Those who raise the allegation that Islam was spread with the sword will now be terribly disgraced.” [Malfuzat, English ed., vol. 2, p. 246]
This rejection of compulsion applies to not only non-Muslims but Muslims as well. Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) emphasized that true worship requires voluntary intention (niyyah). When a state uses the whip or prison to force people to pray, it does not produce righteous believers; it produces hypocrites (munafiqin)—a spiritual condition the Holy Qur’an condemns as worse than open disbelief [4:146]. In his commentary of the verses:
فَذَكِّرْ إِنَّمَا أَنتَ مُذَكِّرٌ
لَّسْتَ عَلَيْهِم بِمُصَيْطِرٍ
Admonish, therefore, for thou art but an admonisher; Thou hast no authority to compel them. [88:22-23]
He explained that even the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) was not called upon to police Muslims or non-Muslims in their personal acts of worship:
“The Holy Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, not being a musaytir [warden]applies in both respects: in respect of the believers, and in respect of the disbelievers as well. That is, he is neither a مُصَيْطِر [warden]over the believers, nor a مُصَيْطِر [warden]over the disbelievers. If the disbelievers are forcibly inducted into religion, it can be of no benefit. Outwardly, they will accept the religion, but in their hearts they will remain hypocrites. For this reason, Allah the Exalted, by stating:
لَّسْتَ عَلَيْهِم بِمُصَيْطِرٍ
[Thou art not appointed a warden over them]
has forbidden the forcible induction of the adherents of other religions into Islam, and has made it known: We have not appointed you a warden over them. If you resort to coercion, it will benefit neither the believer nor the disbeliever. The disbeliever will not benefit in the sense that even if he becomes a Muslim out of fear of the sword, he will in any case be a hypocritical Muslim, and a hypocrite is worse than a disbeliever. The believers will not benefit because hypocrites will weaken their strength, not increase it. He is not a مُصَيْطِر [warden]over the believers because the pleasure of Allah the Exalted can be attained by man only as a result of such deeds as are performed out of heartfelt enthusiasm and willingness. The person in whose heart there is, personally, no fervour for the love of Allah the Exalted, and in whose chest no ardour to act upon His commandments is found, is a stranger to the paths of ma‘rifat [divine gnosis]and sincerity. Even if he performs a good deed under compulsion, his soul will not attain purity, nor will those deeds of his be viewed with the eye of acceptance in the presence of Allah the Exalted. For this reason, it was stated that you have not been sent as a musaytir [warden]over the people. Whoever disbelieves and, despite admonition, does not desist from his misdeeds, leave him to Us; no benefit will come of your coercion. And as for him who is a Muslim, advance him in virtue through enthusiasm and willingness, so that he may attain the benefit of faith.” [Tafsir-e-Kabir, vol. 12, pg. 147]
Testifying Before the Munir Court of Inquiry (1954)
Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) formally and unequivocally addressed the state’s role in enforcing religious law when he testified before the Court of Inquiry constituted to investigate the 1953 anti-Ahmadiyya Punjab riots (the Munir Commission). Under cross-examination, he explicitly stated that an Islamic state has no religious mandate to compel adherence to Huququllah (the Rights of Allah/personal acts of worship):
“Question: Is it the religious duty of an Islamic government to enforce upon all Muslims the observance of all injunctions of the Qur’an and Sunnah, including laws pertaining to Huququllah (rights of Allah)?
“Answer: The fundamental principle of Islam is that the responsibility for sin is individual, and a person is responsible only for those sins which they themselves commit. Therefore, if a person violates the Qur’an and Sunnah in an Islamic state, they alone are accountable for it.
“In response to the questions of the Court, dated January 14, 1954:
“Question: Yesterday you stated that the responsibility for sin is individual. Suppose I am a Muslim citizen of an Islamic government, and I see another person committing a violation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Is it my religious duty that I should stop him from this violation? By religious duty, I mean: if I do not stop him from doing so, am I myself considered a sinner?
“Answer: Your duty is only to advise that person.
“Question: If I am a person in authority (Sahib-e-Amr), will the situation still be the same?
“Answer: Even then, it is not your religious duty to forcibly stop that person from doing so.
“Question: If I am a person in authority, would it be my duty to enact a worldly law that makes such violations punishable?
“Answer: No, doing so would not be your religious duty, though you would have the discretion to enact such a law.” [Tehqiqati Adalat Mein Hazrat Imam Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya Ka Bayan, Anwar-ul-Uloom, vol. 24, pp. 362–363]
Critics might present his remark that a government has the “discretion to enact such a law,” as evidence that he supported state coercion.
However, there is a world of difference between what a government can do and what Islam commands it to do. As a matter of practical law, any sovereign government technically has the legal power to pass all kinds of strict rules—just as a state has the power to impose curfews or ban certain foods. Acknowledging that a government has this legal power is simply stating a fact, not endorsing it.
Rather, as his direct counsel to the nascent state of Pakistan illustrates, he emphatically warned governments against exercising authority in this manner.
Advice to the State and Citizens of Pakistan (1949)
Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) warned modern Muslim-majority states against the illusion that spiritual piety can be manufactured through state policing. In an address delivered on November 11, 1949, he advised Pakistani state officials that, “instead of enforcing their commands through force and the coercion, they should try to have them accepted through love and affection.” (p. 308)
In the same address, he rebuked citizens who demanded state enforcement of religious rituals, highlighting the absurdity of turning personal worship into a matter of criminal law:
“When you do not wish to offer Prayer, what should the Government of Pakistan do? Do you want it to appoint police who would take you to the mosques by force of the baton? And if you yourselves wish to offer Prayers with a sincere heart, what need is there for any law or police of the Government of Pakistan in this regard? Similarly, if you do not wish to perform Hajj, or do not wish to pay Zakat, do you want the government to take you forcibly for Hajj and forcibly collect Zakat from you? You do not perform a single one of these deeds, yet you say: ‘We desire to establish an Islamic government.’ What a great mockery this is!
“Just reflect. If this very question that I have posed to you people at this time were advertised in Europe and America—that a Muslim wishes to offer Prayer; no law prevents him from offering Prayer; a mosque exists in every city, indeed in every neighbourhood of every large city; yet the Muslim complains as to why the government does not compel him and make him offer Prayer—tell me, what will they say? Will they say that Muslims are fools, or will they say that it is the fault of the government?” (Pakistan Ki Taraqqi Aur Us Ke Istehkam Ke Silsile Mein Zarin Nasaih, Anwar-ul-Uloom, Vol. 21, pp. 315–316)
The Jurisprudential Boundary: Public Order vs. Personal Conscience
Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) consistently maintained that an Islamic state does not possess the theological mandate to enforce doctrine upon its citizens or monitor private devotion. He argued that Islam provides a progressive framework of governance rooted in democratic principles, social welfare, absolute justice, and uncompromised religious liberty, to the degree that non-Muslim citizens are granted complete freedom not only to practice, but also to peacefully preach their respective faiths without state interference. [Tehqiqati Adalat Mein Hazrat Imam Jama’at-e-Ahmadiyya Ka Bayan, Anwar-ul-Uloom, Vol. 24, p. 361]
Islam does not operate in a moral vacuum; its legislative framework and policy decisions and are fundamentally guided by Islamic values and teachings of justice and public welfare. However, the foundational Qur’anic dictum:
“There is no compulsion in religion” [2:257] strictly prohibits the state from forcing any individual to profess a belief, alter their faith, or perform private acts of worship against their will. This is why historical Islamic jurisprudence recognized autonomous personal-status courts for religious minorities, enabling them to resolve domestic and religious affairs according to their own traditions.
The state’s coercive power is legitimate only when safeguarding public order, national security, human rights, and the administration of justice—the sphere of Huquq-ul-Ibad (the Rights of Servants). Just as modern legal systems govern civil and criminal liability regardless of personal belief, an Islamic administration enforces civic laws to curb exploitation, secure life and property, and preserve public peace.
Conclusion
In short, the claim that Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) threatened or advocated for religious coercion is a baseless distortion of his writings. His 1936 remarks were not a blueprint for theocratic governance, but a critique of human nature—illustrating how quickly people yield to the temporal power of dictators while neglecting their eternal accountability to God. When directly asked to articulate the constitutional and theological stance of Islam regarding state authority, he consistently upheld absolute freedom of conscience.
In full harmony with the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), and the teachings of the Promised Messiah (peace be upon him), Hazrat Musleh-e-Mau’ud (may Allah be pleased with him) championed an enduring principle: faith forced at the point of a sword or by the arm of the state is not faith at all, but hypocrisy. He therefore maintained that in religiously diverse and non-Muslim societies, a secular state represents the most effective safeguard of universal justice and equity for all citizens, and even within a Muslim-majority land where an Islamic administration is democratically instituted, the state has no right to police personal belief or practice.
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community remains entirely dedicated to this ideal, advocating that hearts must be won through the power of reason, moral persuasion, and prayer, rather than the machinery of state coercion.
Azhar Goraya Sahib is a Missionary of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community USA, currently serving in Tucson, Arizona.